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Justice and Global Health Research
Sridhar Venkatapuram, University of Johannesburg and King’s College London
One of the most interesting and knotty puzzles in global
health justice can be found in Margaret Whitehead’s deci-
sion tree for determining which health inequalities across
human beings demand a social response. Whitehead argued
that the subset of health inequalities that are avoidable,
unnecessary, and unfair or unjust are health “inequities”
(Whitehead 1990). While inequalities are value-free observa-
tions, inequities are moral bads that demand social action.
While the effort is praiseworthy, I have argued elsewhere
that many aspects of the health equity principles are prob-
lematic (Venkatapuram 2011). In particular, at the first step,
a health inequality or impairment that is deemed unavoid-
able is moved outside of the scope of equity, ethics, and jus-
tice. In philosophy, it is often stated that a moral “ought
implies can.” So if a disease/impairment is unpreventable
or untreatable, there cannot be an ethical duty to prevent or
mitigate a resulting health inequality. However, such a first
cut would also dissipate any claims to or duties to conduct
research on a disease/impairment that is currently unavoid-
able because we lack the knowledge about how to do so. A
health inequality can also be unavoidable because there are
not enough resources in a specific location to apply extant
knowledge such as in many developing countries. Therefore,
in relation to health and more, the prevailing view has been
that moral claims and duties that cannot be immediately ful-
filled are meaningless. Informed by his analyses of famines
and Ronald Dworkin’s account of rights, Amartya Sen
offered a novel argument for a “meta-right”—a meta-right
to x is a right to policies p(x) that genuinely aim to have the
right to x realizable (Sen 1984). Sen’s meta-right challenges
Whitehead’s first principle. When a health inequality is
deemed unavoidable, a meta-right to health can still moti-
vate both health sciences research and broader social and
economic policies that aim toward realizing a right to health.
That is why it is at the core of my argument for a human
right to health or, more accurately, a meta-right to the meta-
capability to be healthy.
It is thus noteworthy that Pratt and Hyder present a jus-
tice-based argument and an “ethical checklist” for the
governance of transnational global health research consortia
(GHRCs) (Pratt and Hyder 2016) They present criteria for
what global health research should be done as well as who
should do what, where, when, how, and so forth. Impor-
tantly, these criteria are said to reflect the capabilities
approach (CA) to (global) health justice, particularly relying
on Jennifer Prah Ruger’s prolific writings on health (care)
governance. I am wholly sympathetic with the mission of
linking global health research to conceptions of (global) jus-
tice, as well as to extending and utilizing the CA for such a
mission. However, Pratt and Hyder’s argument is unsatisfac-
tory. I focus on three aspects, including their principle of
LMICs first and foremost; their priority of worst off in terms
of shortfall equity; and their purpose of science.
Throughout the article and in the checklist, Pratt and
Hyder assert the importance of the GHRCs ensuring that
their LMIC research partners are the center of the research
endeavor; their voices and those of their community mem-
bers must be heard; their priorities should determine the
GHRC’s priorities; most of the GHRC’s resources should
go to the LMIC researchers and research; and leadership
roles should be given to LMIC researchers. Pratt and
Hyder do not provide any justification for why research
resources should be directed to LMICs in the first place, or
for why GHRCs should be initially formed. They point to
the CA for such justification, and focus on arguing for put-
ting LMIC research(ers) first in various aspects of the func-
tioning of the consortia. This is understandable as so much
of health equity, human rights, and human-centered devel-
opment thinking argues for participation of those affected
(i.e., “nothing about us without us”). However, an impor-
tant consideration moves against a uniform central role for
LMIC researchers, especially codified into a checklist.
In global justice philosophy, there is a general acceptance
of an ethical duty to correct harms one has caused even if it
occurs in other countries (Føllesdal and Pogge 2005). It is also
recognized that there is an ethical duty to prevent possible
future harms from one’s actions. Correcting past harms and
preventing future harms could address significant human
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suffering/health inequalities in theworld. This could produce
duties to conduct global health research and form GHRCs.
For actors who appear to have no past or future harm links to
people that are suffering in the world, the possible duty to act
is based on capacity. (Sen 2009; Singer 2004) One has a moral
obligation to consider helping alleviate suffering of individu-
als wherever one finds them, in light of and commensurate to
one’s capacity to do so. In other words, one ought to help if
one can and to the extent one can. According to Pratt and
Hyder’s argument, rich country GHRC members may have
exceptional capacity but their focus must be on building self-
sufficiency of LMIC research partners. Why should improv-
ing skills and capacity of LMIC researchers be a stronger
moral duty than the duty of helping alleviate suffering of peo-
ple commensurate with one’s exceptional capacity? There is
no central tenet of the CA that would privilege LMIC
researchers in all aspects. Moreover, GHRCs usually involve
LMIC researchers across a number of countries. While the
authors focus on the dyadic relationships between LMIC and
HIC researchers, what are the procedures and principles for
adjudicating disagreements between researchers from differ-
ent LMICs within the consortia?
Pratt and Hyder argue that research priorities of GHRCs
should reflect the needs of the worst off in LMICs. Following
Ruger, they define the worst off in terms of those who have
the greatest shortfall from the world’s highest/best health
achievements (Ruger 2010). While it is not clear whether the
basic unit is individuals or groups, let’s assume they mean
groups (contra a central aspect of the CA). If we take Japan,
which has the world’s highest life expectancy as the standard,
then those LMICs or groups within LMICs with the greatest
shortfall from that Japanese threshold should get priority in
research. However, shortfall equity does not necessarily mean
that the standard from which one measures has to be the
highest achievable outcome in the world. A sufficient or aver-
age threshold could also be used. Pratt andHyder go with the
highest outcomes in human populations. Given that there is
reasonable disagreement on whether one kind of impairment
is worse than other, or whether staying alive is always good,
there would have to be a lot of work done before we could
rank which LMICs or groups according to their shortfalls.
One could imagine that a measurement such as the disability-
adjusted life year (DALY) would be very helpful. It may be
plausible to identify what diseases/impairments create the
greatest shortfall (most DALYs lost) across countries or across
groups within countries. Such ranking could then act as a
research priority-setting exercise for GHRCs. However,
whether using DALYs or another metric, much more reason-
ing must be provided for aiming to achieve maximal out-
comes. Prioritizing research according to greatest group
shortfall presumably is in order to produce research outputs
that will have the greatest reductions in health inequalities.
Given that the CA was partially born out of the critique of
utilitarianism including its central tenet of maximization, it
would be inconsistent to aim for maximization in a CA-based
argument without giving a clear justification.
A third and important component of Pratt and Hyder’s
argument is the implicit assertion that the primary aim of
GHRCs should be reducing health disparities within and
across countries. Given that GHRCs are research coordi-
nating entities, the assertion is that the aim of the scientists
involved should be to reduce health disparities. Further-
more, as the checklist is meant for all GHRCs, all scientists
involved in any GHRCmust do science that aims to reduce
health disparities (to the greatest extent). While we may be
able to argue that one primary aim of GHRCs should be to
reduce health disparities on various grounds, the move to
assert that all the research and scientists involved in
GHRCs must have a social mission may be unwise. Recon-
ciling the aims and methods of scientific practice with
instrumental and social goals such as reducing health dis-
parities requires much more careful reasoning than pro-
vided here. The authors are especially vulnerable for relying
on Ruger’s expositions on governance in order to establish
the moral purpose of GHRCs and their scientists. In particu-
lar, the debates about the moral purposes of health sciences
have recently flourished to the greatest extent in relation to
social determinants of health research, or social epidemiol-
ogy. At least in the articles the authors cite, Ruger expressly
excludes social determinants of health from social policy
because “we do not know enough.” Ruger’s argument
regarding research is that the focus on health capability
motivates claims to research on health care, broadly under-
stood to include public health goods and services and equi-
table finance. As a result, Ruger’s governance framework is
closed off to important ethical arguments for doing science
to reduce social inequalities in health while also doing excel-
lent science. Without being informed by these debates or
much philosophy of science, Pratt and Hyder’s argument
and checklist are vulnerable to the charge that the health sci-
ences are being infused with social values and likely to
result in bad science. &
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